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Abstract
Generating adversarial examples is an intriguing prob-
lem and an important way of understanding the working
mechanism of deep neural networks. Most existing ap-
proaches generated perturbations in the image space, i.e.,
each pixel can be modified independently. However, in this
paper we pay special attention to the subset of adversarial
examples that correspond to meaningful changes in 3D
physical properties (like rotation and translation, illumi-
nation condition, etc.). These adversaries arguably pose
a more serious concern, as they demonstrate the possibility
of causing neural network failure by easy perturbations of
real-world 3D objects and scenes.
In the contexts of object classification and visual ques-
tion answering, we augment state-of-the-art deep neural
networks that receive 2D input images with a rendering
module (either differentiable or not) in front, so that a 3D
scene (in the physical space) is rendered into a 2D image
(in the image space), and then mapped to a prediction (in
the output space). The adversarial perturbations can now
go beyond the image space, and have clear meanings in the
3D physical world. Though image-space adversaries can be
interpreted as per-pixel albedo change, we verify that they
cannot be well explained along these physically meaningful
dimensions, which often have a non-local effect. But it is
still possible to successfully attack beyond the image space
on the physical space, though this is more difficult than
image-space attacks, reflected in lower success rates and
heavier perturbations required.
1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a rapid development in
the area of deep learning, in which deep neural networks
have been applied to a wide range of computer vision
tasks, such as image classification [17][13], object detec-
tion [32], semantic segmentation [35][8], visual question
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Figure 1. The vast majority of existing works on adversarial
attacks focus on modifying pixel values in 2D images to cause
wrong CNN predictions. In our work, we consider the more
complete vision pipeline, where 2D images are in fact projections
of the underlying 3D scene. This suggests that adversarial attacks
can go beyond the image space, and directly change physically
meaningful properties that define the 3D scene. We suspect that
these adversarial examples are more physically plausible and thus
pose more serious security concerns.
answering [2][14], etc. Despite the great success of deep
learning, there still lacks an effective method to understand
the working mechanism of deep neural networks. An in-
teresting effort is to generate so-called adversarial pertur-
bations. They are visually imperceptible noise [12] which,
after being added to an input image, changes the prediction
results completely, sometimes ridiculously. These examples
can be constructed in a wide range of vision problems,
including image classification [26], object detection and
semantic segmentation [39]. Researchers believed that the
existence of adversaries implies unknown properties in the
feature space [37].
Our work is motivated by the fact that conventional 2D
adversaries were often generated by modifying each image
pixel individually. We instead consider perturbations of
the 3D scene that are often non-local and correspond to
physical properties of the object. We notice that previous
work found adversarial examples “in the physical world”
by taking photos on the printed perturbed images [18]. But
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𝑝 = 3.7 × 10−3 conf = 89.9%
𝑝 = 4.7 × 10−3
R: table 
conf = 89.9%
Image Space
Physical Space
Original Input Image
R: cap 
R: helmet Physical SpaceOriginal Input Image
Physical-Space Attack Details
Rotating the object by −2.9, 9.4 and 2.5
(× 10−3 rad) by 𝑥, 𝑦 and 𝑧 axes; then 
moving it by 2.0, 0.0 and 0.2 (× 10−3 unit 
length) along 𝑥, 𝑦 and 𝑧 axes; tuning its 
color by 9.1, 5.4 and −4.8 (× 10−2 max 
intensity) in the RGB space; adjusting the 
light source by −0.3 unit; and change the 
light angle by 9.5, 5.4 and 0.6 (× 10−2
unit).
Q: What size is the other red block that
is the same material as the blue cube?
A: large
A: 0
𝑝 = 2.4 × 10−3 conf = 64.3%
𝑝 = 2.7 × 10−3
A: 0
conf = 52.8%
Image Space
Physical Space
Q:Howmanyother purple objects have the
sameshape as thepurplematteobject?
A: 0
A: 1 Physical Space
Part of Physical-Space Attack Details
• Illumination
Δ𝐋key = 0.0,1.3, −1.9, −2.5 /100, …
•Object 2
Δ𝑟, Δ𝜃 = 1.1,3.6 /100, …
•Object 3
Δ𝑥, Δ𝑦 = −2.9, 5.9 /100, …
•Object 9
Δ𝐜 = −4.2, 0.5,2.2 /100, …
•……
Figure 2. Adversarial examples for 3D object classification and visual question answering, under either a differentiable or a non-
differentiable renderer. The top row shows that while it is of course possible to produce adversarial examples by attacking the image space,
it is also possible to successfully attack on the physical space by changing factors such as surface normal, material, lighting condition (see
Section 3.1). The bottom row demonstrates the same using a more realistic non-differentiable renderer, with descriptions of how to carry
out the attack. p and conf are the perceptibility (see Section 3.2) and the confidence (post-softmax output) on the predicted class.
our work is different and more essential, as we are attacking
the intrinsic parameters that define the 3D scene/object,
whereas [18] is still limited to attacking 2D image pixels.
For this respect, we plug 3D rendering as a network module
into the state-of-the-art neural networks for object classifi-
cation and visual question answering. In this way, we build
a mapping function from the physical space (a set of physi-
cal parameters, including surface normals, illumination and
material), via the image space (a rendered 2D image), to the
output space (the object class or the answer to a question).
See Figure 1 which illustrates this framework.
The per-pixel image-space attack can be explained in
terms of per-pixel changes of albedo, but it is highly un-
likely that these individual perturbations happen to corre-
spond to, e.g., a simple rotation of the object in 3D. Using
our pipeline with rendering, we indeed found it almost im-
possible to approximate the 2D image adversaries using the
3D physically meaningful perturbations. At the same time,
this suggests a natural mechanism for defending adversaries
– finding an approximate solution in the physical space and
re-rendering will make most image-space adversaries fail.
This analysis-by-synthesis process offers new direction in
dealing with adversarial examples and occlusion cases.
Our paper mainly tries to answer the following question:
can neural networks still be fooled if we do not per-
turb 2D image pixels, but instead perturb 3D physical
properties? This is about directly generating perturbations
in the physical space (i.e., modifying basic physical pa-
rameters) that cause the neural network predictions to fail.
Specifically, we compute the difference between the current
output and the desired output, and use gradient descent to
update parameters in the physical space (i.e., beyond the
image space, which contains physical parameters such as
surface normals and illumination conditions). This attack is
implemented by either iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [12] (for differentiable rendering) or the Zeroth-
Order Optimization approach [9] (for non-differentiable
rendering). We constrain the change in the image intensities
to guarantee the perturbations to be visually imperceptible.
Our major finding is that attacking the physical space is
more difficult than attacking the image space. Although
it is possible to find adversaries in this way (see Figure 2
for a few of these examples), the success rate is lower
and the perceptibility of perturbations becomes much larger
than required in the image space. This is expected, as
the rendering process couples changes in pixel values, i.e.,
modifying one physical parameter (e.g., illumination) may
cause many pixels to be changed at the same time.
2. Related Work
Deep learning is the state-of-the-art machine learning
technique to learn visual representations from labeled data.
Yet despite the success of deep learning, it remains chal-
lenging to explain what is learned by these complicated
models. One of the most interesting evidence is adver-
saries [12]: small noise that is (i) imperceptible to humans,
and (ii) able to cause deep neural networks make wrong
predictions after being added to the input image. Early stud-
ies were mainly focused on image classification [26][25].
But soon, researchers were able to attack deep networks for
detection and segmentation [39], and also visual question
answering [40]. Efforts were also made in finding universal
perturbations which can transfer across images [24], as well
as adversarial examples in the physical world produced by
taking photos on the printed perturbed images [18].
Attacking a known network (both network architecture
and weights are given, a.k.a, a white box) started with
setting a goal. There were generally two types of goals.
The first one (a non-targeted attack) aimed at reducing the
probability of the true class [26], and the second one (a tar-
geted attack) defined a specific class that the network should
predict [21]. After that, the error between the current and
the target predictions was computed, and gradients back-
propagated to the image layer. This idea was developed
into a set of algorithms, including the Steepest Gradient
Descent Method (SGDM) [25] and the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [12]. The difference lies in that SGDM
computed accurate gradients, while FGSM merely kept the
sign in every dimension. The iterative version of these two
algorithms were also studied [18]. In comparison, attacking
an unknown network (a.k.a., a black box) is much more
challenging [21], and an effective way is to sum up per-
turbations from a set of white-box attacks [39]. In opposite,
there exist efforts in protecting deep networks from adver-
sarial attacks [29][19][38]. People also designed algorithms
to hack these defenders [6] as well as to detect whether
adversarial attacks are present [23]. This competition has
boosted both attackers and defenders to a higher level [3].
More recently, there is increasing interest in adversarial
attacks other than modifying pixel values. [18] showed that
the adversarial effect still exists if we print the digitally-
perturbed 2D image on paper. [10][30] fooled vision sys-
tems by rotating the 2D image or changing its brightness.
[11][4] created real-world 3D objects, either by 3D print-
ing or applying stickers, that consistently cause perception
failure. However, these adversaries have high perceptibility
and must involve sophisticated change in object appearance.
To find adversarial examples in 3D, we use a renderer, either
differentiable or non-differentiable, to map a 3D scene to a
2D image and then to the output. In this way it is possible,
though challenging, to generate interpretable and physically
plausible adversarial perturbations in the 3D scene.
3. Approach
3.1. From Physical Parameters to Prediction
As the basis of this work, we extend deep neural net-
works to receive the physical parameters of a 3D scene,
render them into a 2D image, and output prediction, e.g.,
the class of an object, or the answer to a visual question.
Note that our research involves 3D to 2D rendering as
part of the pipeline, which stands out from previous work
which either worked on rendered 2D images [36][15], or
directly processed 3D data without rendering them into 2D
images [31][34].
We denote the physical space, image space and output
space by X , Y and Z , respectively. Given a 3D scene X ∈
X , the first step is to render it into a 2D image Y ∈ Y , and
the second step is to predict the output ofY, denoted byZ ∈
Z . The overall framework is denoted by Z = f [r(X) ;θ],
where r(·) is the renderer, f [·;θ] is the target deep network
with θ being parameters.
There are different models for the 3D rendering func-
tion r(·). One of them is differentiable [20], which consid-
ers three sets of physical parameters, i.e., surface normals
N, illumination L, and material m1. By giving these
parameters, we assume that the camera geometries, e.g.,
position, rotation, field-of-view, etc., are known beforehand
and will remain unchanged in each case. The rendering
module is denoted by Y = r(N,L,m). In practice,
the rendering process is implemented as a network layer,
which is differentiable to input parameters N, L and m.
Another option is to use a non-differentiable renderer which
often provides much higher quality [5][22]. In practice we
choose an open-source software named Blender [5]. Not
assuming differentiability makes it possible to work on a
wider range of parameters, such as color (C), translation
(T), rotation (R) and lighting (L) considered in this work,
in which translation and rotation cannot be implemented by
a differentiable renderer2.
1In this model, N is a 2-channel image of spatial size WN × HN,
where each pixel is encoded by the azimuth and polar angles of the normal
vector at this position; L is defined by an HDR environment map of
dimension WL × HL, with each pixel storing the intensity of the light
coming from this direction (a spherical coordinate system is used); and m
impacts image rendering with a set of bidirectional reflectance distribution
functions (BRDFs) which describe the point-wise light reflection for both
diffuse and specular surfaces [27]. The material parameters used in this
paper come from the directional statistics BRDF model [28], which repre-
sents a BRDF as a combination of Dm distributions with Pm parameters
in each. Mathematically, we have N ∈ RWN×HN×2, L ∈ RWL×HL
and m ∈ RDm×Pm .
2For 3D object classification, we follow [36] to configure the 3D
scene. L is a 5-dimensional vector, where the first two dimensions indicate
the magnitudes of the environment and point light sources, and the last
three the position of the point light source. C, T, R are all 3-dimensional
properties of the single object. For 3D visual question answering we
follow [14]. L is a 12-dimensional vector that represents the energy and
position of 3 point light sources. For every object in the scene, C is
3-dimensional, corresponding to RGB; T is 2-dimensional which is the
We consider two popular object understanding tasks,
namely, 3D object classification and 3D visual question
answering, both of which are straightforward based on the
rendered 2D images. Object classification is built upon
standard deep networks, and visual question answering,
when both the input image Y and question q are given, is
also a variant of image classification (the goal is to choose
the correct answer from a pre-defined set of choices).
In the adversary generation stage, given pre-trained net-
works, the goal is to attack a model Z = f [r(X) ;θ] =
f ◦ r(X;θ). For object classification, θ is fixed network
weights, denoted by θC. For visual question answering, it
is weights from an assembled network determined by the
question q, denoted by θV(q). Z ∈ [0, 1]K is the output,
with K being the number of object classes or choices.
3.2. Attacks Beyond the Image Space
Attacking the physical parameters starts with setting a
goal, which is what we hope the network to predict. This
is done by minimizing a loss function L(Z), which de-
termines how far the current output is from the desired
status. An adversarial attack may either be targeted or non-
targeted, and in this work we focus on the non-targeted
attack, which specifies a class c′ (usually the original true
class) as which the image should not be classified, and the
goal is to minimize the c′-th dimension of the output Z:
L(Z) .= L(Z; c′) = Zc′ .
An obvious way to attack the physical space works
by expanding the loss function L(Z), i.e., L(Z) =
L ◦ f ◦ r(X;θ), and minimizing this function with respect
to the physical parameters X. The optimization starts with
an initial (unperturbed) state X0
.
= X. A total of Tmax
iterations are performed. In the t-th round, we compute
the gradient vectors with respect to Xt−1, i.e., ∆Xt =
∇Xt−1L ◦ f ◦ r(Xt−1,θ), and update Xt−1 along this di-
rection: Xt = Xt−1 + η ·∆Xt−1, where η is the learning
rate. This iterative process is terminated if the goal of
attacking is achieved or the maximal number of iterations
Tmax is reached. The accumulated perturbation over all T
iterations is denoted by ∆X = η ·∑Tt=1∆Xt.
The way of computing gradients ∆Xt depends on
whether r(·) is differentiable. If so, this can be simply
back-propagate gradients from the output space to the phys-
ical space. We follow the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [12] to only preserve the sign in each dimension
of the gradient vector. Otherwise, we apply zeroth-order
optimization. To attack the d-th dimension in X, we set a
small value δ and approximate the gradient ofZ by ∂L(Z)∂Xd ≈
L◦f◦r(X+δ·ed)−L◦f◦r(X−δ·ed)
2×δ , where ed is a D-dimensional
vector with the d-th dimension set to be 1 and all the others
to be 0. In general, every step of such update may randomly
object’s 2D location on the plane; R is a scalar rotation angle.
select a subset of all D dimensions for efficiency consider-
ations, so our optimization algorithm is a form of stochastic
coordinate descent. This is reminiscent of [9], where each
step updates the values of a random subset of pixel values.
Also following [9], we use the Adam optimizer [16] instead
of standard gradient descent for its faster convergence.
3.3. Perceptibility
The goal of an adversarial attack is to produce a visu-
ally imperceptible perturbation, so that the network makes
incorrect predictions after it is added to the original image.
Given a rendering modelY = r(X) and an added perturba-
tion ∆X, the perturbation added to the rendered image is:
∆Y = r(X+ ∆X)− r(X).
There are in general two ways of computing percepti-
bility. One of them works directly on the rendered image,
which is similar to the definition in [37][25]: p .= p(∆Y) =(
1
WN×HN
∑WN
w=1
∑HN
h=1 ‖∆yw,h‖22
)1/2
, where yw,h is a 3-
dimensional vector representing the RGB intensities (nor-
malized in [0, 1]) of a pixel. Similarly, we can also define
the perceptibility values for each set of physical parameters,
e.g., p(∆N) =
(
1
WN×HN
∑WN
w=1
∑HN
h=1 ‖∆nw,h‖22
)1/2
.
We take p(∆Y) as the major criterion of visual imper-
ceptibility. Because of continuity, this can guarantee that
all physical perturbations are sufficiently small as well. An
advantage of placing the perceptibility constraint on pixels
is that it allows a fair comparison of the attack success rates
between image space attacks and physical space attacks. It
also allows a direct comparison between attacks on different
physical parameters. One potential disadvantage of plac-
ing the perceptibility constraint on physical parameters is
that different physical parameters have different units and
ranges. For example, the value range of RGB is [0, 255],
whereas that of spatial translation is (−∞,∞). It is not di-
rectly obvious how to find a common threshold for different
physical parameters.
When using the differentiable renderer, in order to guar-
antee imperceptibility, we constrain the RGB intensity
changes on the image layer. In each iteration, after a new set
of physical perturbations are generated, we check all pixels
on the re-rendered image, and any perturbations exceed-
ing a fixed threshold U = 18 from the original image is
truncated. Truncations cause the inconsistency between the
physical parameters and the rendered image and risk fail-
ures in attacking. To avoid frequent truncations, we set the
learning rate η to be small, which consequently increases
the number of iterations needed to attack the network.
When using the non-differentiable renderer, we pursue
an alternative approach by adding another term ‖∆Y‖22 into
the loss function (weighted by λ) [9, 6], such that optimiza-
tion can balance between attack success and perceptibility.
Attacking Image Surface N. Illumination Material Combined
Perturbations Succ. p Succ. p Succ. p Succ. p Succ. p
On AlexNet 100.00 5.7 89.27 10.8 29.61 25.8 18.88 25.8 94.42 18.1
On ResNet-34 99.57 5.1 88.41 9.3 14.16 29.3 3.43 55.2 94.85 16.4
Table 1. Effect of white-box adversarial attacks on ShapeNet object classification. By combined, we allow the three sets of physical
parameters to be perturbed jointly. Succ. denotes the success rate of attacks (%, higher is better), and p is the perceptibility value (unit:
10−3, lower is better). All p values are measured in the image space, i.e., they are directly comparable.
3.4. Interpreting Image Space Adversaries in Phys-
ical Space
We do a reality check to confirm that image-space adver-
saries are almost never consistent with the non-local phys-
ical perturbations according to our (admittedly imperfect)
rendering model. They are, of course, consistent with per-
pixel changes of albedo.
We first find a perturbation ∆Y in the image space, and
then compute a perturbation in the physical space, ∆X,
that corresponds to ∆Y. This is to set the optimization
goal in the image space instead of the output space, though
the optimization process is barely changed. Note that
we are indeed pursuing interpreting ∆Y in the physical
space. Not surprisingly, as we will show in experiments,
the reconstruction loss ‖Y + ∆Y − r(X+ ∆X)‖1 does
not go down, suggesting that approximations of ∆Y in the
physical space either do not exist, or cannot be found by the
currently available optimization methods such as FGSM.
4. Experiments
4.1. 3D Object Classification
3D object recognition experiments are conducted on the
ShapeNetCore-v2 dataset [7], which contains 55 rigid ob-
ject categories, each with various 3D models. Two popular
deep neural networks are used: an 8-layer AlexNet [17] and
a 34-layer deep residual network [13]. Both networks are
pre-trained on the ILSVRC2012 dataset [33], and fine-tuned
in our training set for 40 epochs using batch size 256. The
learning rate is 0.001 for AlexNet and 0.005 for ResNet-34.
We experiment with both a differentiable renderer [20]
and a non-differentiable renderer [5], and as a result there
are some small differences in the experimental setup, de-
spite the shared settings described above.
For the differentiable renderer, we randomly sample
125 3D models from each class, and select 4 fixed view-
points for each object, so that each category has 500 train-
ing images. Similarly, another randomly chosen 50 × 4
images for each class are used for testing. AlexNet and
ResNet-34 achieve 73.59% and 79.35% top-1 classification
accuracies, respectively. These numbers are comparable
to the single-view baseline accuracy reported in [36]. For
each class, from the correctly classified testing samples,
we choose 5 images with the highest classification proba-
GT: car
Attacking AlexNet (A) & ResNet (R)
A: car 
R: car 
A: pillow  R: helmet
𝑝 = 7.9 × 10−3 𝑝 = 6.7 × 10−3
conf = 93.5% conf = 60.9%
Attacking AlexNet (A) & ResNet (R)
A: train 
R: train 
A: vessel  R: vessel 
GT: train
𝑝 = 9.7 × 10−3 𝑝 = 4.4 × 10−3
conf = 95.0% conf = 76.6%
Figure 3. Examples of physical-space adversaries in 3D object
classification on ShapeNet (using a differentiable renderer). In
each example, the top row shows the original testing image, which
is correctly classified by both AlexNet (A) and ResNet (R). The
following two rows show the perturbations and the attacked image,
respectively. All perturbations are magnified by a factor of 5 and
shifted by 128. p is the perceptibility value, and conf is the
confidence (post-softmax output) of the prediction.
bilities on ResNet-34, and filter out 22 of them which are
incorrectly classified by AlexNet, resulting in a target set of
233 images. The attack algorithm is the iterative version of
FGSM [12]. We use the SGD optimizer with momentum
0.9 and weight decay 10−4, and the maximal number of
iterations is 120. Learning rate is 0.002 for attacking image
space, 0.003 for attacking illumination and material, and
0.004 for attacking surface normal.
For the non-differentiable renderer, we render images
with an azimuth angle uniformly sampled from [0, pi), a
fixed elevation angle of pi/9 and a fixed distance of 1.8.
AlexNet gives a 65.89% top-1 testing set classification ac-
curacy, and ResNet-34 achieves an even higher number of
68.88%. Among 55 classes, we find 51 with at least two
images correctly classified. From each of them, we choose
the two correct testing cases with the highest confidence
score and thus compose a target set with 102 images. The
Prediction: rocket
 
Physical Attack Details
✁ Color (C)
✌ ✄✂☎✆✝✞✟✂✠✆✡✡✂☛ ☞✡✟✟ in RGB space
✁ Translation (T)
✌ ✡✂✡✆ ✟✂✍✆✟✂✎ ☞✡✟✟ (unit) by ✏, ✑ and ✒
✁ Rotation (R)
✓ ✔✕✖✗✘✙✕✚✗✛✕✜ ✢✣✔✔ (rad) by ✤, ✥ and ✦
✁ Illumination (L)
Environment light energy unchanged
Point light geometry ✌ ✝✡✂✄✆✎✂✍✆✧✂✎ ☞✡✟✟
Point light energy ✌ ✝✎✂✎ ☞✡✟✟
Prediction: knife
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Physical Attack Details
✁ Color (C)
✌ ✡☎✂✎✆✝✞✞✂✠✆☛✂✞ ☞✡✟✟ in RGB space
✁ Translation (T)
✌ ✡✂✞✆ ✡✂☎✆✟✂☎ ☞✡✟✟ (unit) by ✏, ✑ and ✒
✁ Rotation (R)
✓ ✘✜✕★✗ ✜✕✚✗ ✘✚✕✖ ✢✣✔✔ (rad) by ✤, ✥ and ✦
✁ Illumination (L)
Environment light energy unchanged
Point light geometry ✌ ✝✠✂✟✆✝✡✂✎✆✍✂✄ ☞✡✟✟
Point light energy ✌ ✧✂✄ ☞✡✟✟
Prediction: mailbox
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Physical Attack Details
✁ Color (C)
✌ ✡✂✟✆✝✡☛✂✧✆✡✂✟ ☞✡✟✟ in RGB
✁ Translation (T)
✌ ✟✂✎✆ ✞✂✄✆✟✂✄ ☞✡✟✟ (unit) by ✏, ✑ and ✒
✁ Rotation (R)
✓ ✛✕✛✗✘✔✕✚✗✣✕✜ ✢✣✔✔ (rad) by ✤, ✥ and ✦
✁ Illumination (L)
Environment light energy unchanged
Point light geometry ✌ ✍✂✍✆ ✝✍✂☛✆✠✂✡ ☞✡✟✟
Point light energy ✌ ✝✡✂✧ ☞✡✟✟
Prediction: airplane
✩
Prediction: airplane
✩
Image-pixel Attack
Physical-dimension Attack
LRTC ✪
✫
✬
✔✕✭✙✣✭
Y ✟✂✧☛✧✟
Y ✟✂☎✍✧✎
YY ✟✂✎✡☎✍
Y ✟✂✄☛✠✠
YY ✟✂✠☛☎✠
YY ✟✂☎✠✠☎
YYY ✟✂✧☎☎✟
Y ✔✕✭✖✣✚
YY ✟✂✧✠✟✍
YY ✟✂☎✧✄✄
YYY ✟✂✧☛✞✎
YY ✟✂✄✍☎✞
YYY ✟✂✠✎✠☎
YYY ✟✂☎✡✟✡
YYYY ✟✂✧✠☛✄
✪
✫
✬
✮ ✟✂✧☎✟✧
✪
✫
✬
✮ ✟✂✧✠☛✄
Prediction: guitar
✩
Prediction: guitar
✩
Image-pixel Attack
Physical-dimension Attack
LRTC ✪
✫
✬
✣✕✔✔✔✔
Y ✟✂✄✠✧✞
Y ✡✂✟✟✟✟
YY ✟✂✄✎☛✧
Y ✡✂✟✟✟✟
YY ✟✂✧✄✠☎
YY ✡✂✟✟✟✟
YYY ✟✂✧✎✧✎
Y ✣✕✔✔✔✔
YY ✟✂✄✠✟✍
YY ✡✂✟✟✟✟
YYY ✟✂✄✎✞✠
YY ✡✂✟✟✟✟
YYY ✟✂✧✄✞✡
YYY ✡✂✟✟✟✟
YYYY ✟✂✧✎✟✍
✪
✫
✬
✮ ✟✂✧☛✎✎
✪
✫
✬
✮ ✟✂✧✎✟✍
Prediction: table
✩
Prediction: table
✩
Image-pixel Attack
Physical-dimension Attack
LRTC ✪
✫
✬
✔✕✭★✛✚
Y ✟✂✄☎✧✍
Y ✟✂☎✧☎☛
YY ✟✂✄✎☎✄
Y ✟✂✎✍✧☛
YY ✟✂✧✞✧✎
YY ✟✂✧✧✞✄
YYY ✟✂✠✟✟✍
Y ✔✕✭✙✜✭
YY ✟✂✄✄✡☛
YY ✟✂☎✎✧✧
YYY ✟✂✄✍✄✄
YY ✟✂✎✍✍✡
YYY ✟✂✧✞✍☛
YYY ✟✂✧✧✎✍
YYYY ✟✂✠✟✧✄
✪
✫
✬
✮ ✟✂✧✡✡✧
✪
✫
✬
✮ ✟✂✠✟✧✄
✪
✫
✬
✮ ✟✂☎✍✡☎ ✪
✫
✬
✮ ✡✂✟✟✟✟ ✪
✫
✬
✮ ✟✂☎✄✠✎
Figure 4. Examples of image-space and physical-space adversaries in 3D object classification on ShapeNet (using a non-differentiable
renderer). In each example, the top row contains the original testing image and the detailed description of mid-level physical operations
that can cause classification to fail. In the bottom row, we show the perturbations and attacked images in both attacks. Z′c is the confidence
(post-softmax output) of the true class. For each case, we also show results with different combinations of physical attacks in a table (a Y
indicates the corresponding attack is on).
attack algorithm is ZOO [9] with δ = 10−4, η = 2× 10−3
and λ = 0.1. The maximal number of iterations is 500 for
AlexNet and 200 for ResNet-34.
4.1.1 Differentiable Renderer Results
First, we demonstrate in Table 1 that adversaries widely
exist in the image space – as researchers have explored
before [37][25], it is easy to confuse the network with small
perturbations. In our case, the success rate is at or close to
100% and the perceptibility does not exceed 10−2.
The next study is to find the correspondence of these
image-space perturbations in the physical space. We tried
the combination of 3 learning rates (10−3, 10−4, 10−5) and
2 optimizers (SGD, Adam). However, for AlexNet, the ob-
jective (`1-distance) remains mostly constant; the malicious
label after image-space attack is kept in only 8 cases, and in
the vast majority cases, the original true label of the object
is recovered. Therefore, using the current optimization
method and rendering model, it is very difficult to find
physical parameters that are approximately rendered into
these image-space adversaries. This is expected, as physical
parameters often have a non-local effect on the image.
Finally we turn to directly generating adversaries in the
physical space. As shown in Table 1, this is much more
difficult than in the image space – the success rate becomes
lower and large perceptibility values are often observed on
the successful cases. Typical adversarial examples gener-
ated in the physical space are shown in Figure 3. Allow-
ing all physical parameters to be jointly optimized (i.e.,
the combined strategy) produces the highest success rate.
Among the three sets of physical parameters, attacking
surface normals is more effective than the other two. This
is expected, as using local perturbations is often easier
in attacking deep neural networks [12]. The surface nor-
mal matrix shares the same dimensionality with the image
lattice, and changing an element in the matrix only has
very local impact on the rendered image. In comparison,
illumination and material are both global properties of the
3D scene or the object, so tuning each parameter will cause
a number of pixels to be modified, hence less effective in
adversarial attacks.
We also examined truncation during the attack. For
ResNet-34, on average, only 6.3, 1.6, 0 pixels were ever
truncated for normal, illumination, material throughout the
120 iterations of attack. This number of truncation is rel-
atively small comparing to the size of the rendered image
(448 × 448). Therefore, the truncation is unlikely to con-
tribute much to the attack.
4.1.2 Non-differentiable Renderer Results
We first report quantitative results with two settings, i.e.,
attacking the image space and the physical space. Similarly,
image-space adversaries are relatively easy to find. Among
all 102 cases, 99 of them are successfully attacked within
500 steps on AlexNet, and all of them within 200 steps on
ResNet-34. On the other hand, physical-space adversaries
are much more difficult to construct. Using the same num-
bers of steps (500 on AlexNet and 200 on ResNet-34), the
numbers of success attacks are merely 14 and 6 respectively.
We show several successful cases of image-space and
physical-space attacks in Figure 4. One can see quite dif-
ferent perturbation patterns from these two scenarios. An
image-space perturbation is the sum of pixel-level differ-
ences, e.g., even the intensities of two adjacent pixels can
be modified individually, thus it is unclear if these images
can really appear in the real world, nor can we diagnose the
reason of failure. On the other hand, a physical-space per-
turbation is generated using a few mid-level operations such
as slight rotation, translation and minor lighting changes. In
theory, these adversaries can be instantiated in the physical
world using a fine-level robotic controlling system.
Another benefit of generating physical-dimension adver-
saries lies in the ability of diagnosing vision algorithms.
We use the cases shown in Figure 4 as examples. There
are 14 changeable physical parameters, and we partition
them into 4 groups, i.e., the environment illumination (5 pa-
rameters), object rotation, position and color (3 parameters
each). We enumerate all 24 subsets of these parameters,
and thus generate 24 perturbations by only applying the
perturbations in the subsets. It is interesting to see that
in the first case, the effects of different perturbations are
almost additive, e.g., the joint attack on color and rotation
has roughly the same effect as the sum of individual attacks.
However, this is not always guaranteed. In the second case,
for example, we find that attacking rotation alone produces
little effect, but adding it to color attack causes a dramatic
accuracy drop of 26%. On the other hand, the second case
is especially sensitive to color, and the third one to rotation,
suggesting that different images are susceptible to attacks in
different subspaces. It is the interpretability of the physical-
dimension attacks that provides the possibility to diagnose
these cases at a finer level.
4.2. Visual Question Answering
We extend our experiments to a more challenging vision
task – visual question answering. Experiments are per-
formed on the recently released CLEVR dataset [14]. This
is an engine that can generate an arbitrary number of 3D
scenes with meta-information (object configuration). Each
scene is also equipped with multiple generated questions,
e.g., asking for the number of specified objects in the scene,
or if the object has a specified property.
The baseline algorithm is named Inferring and Executing
Programs (IEP) [15]. It applies an LSTM to parse each
question into a tree-structure program, which is then con-
verted into a neural module network [1] that queries the
visual features. We use the released model without training
it by ourselves. We randomly pick up 100 testing images,
on which all associated questions are correctly answered, as
the target images.
The settings for generating adversarial perturbations
are the same as in the object classification experiments:
when using the differentiable renderer, the iterative FGSM
Attacking Q1 Attacking Q2
A1: large  A2: yes 
Q1: What size is the other blue matte thing that is the same
shape as the yellow rubber thing?
Q2: Are there fewer cyan matte objects than tiny green shiny
blocks?
𝑝 = 6.6 × 10−3 𝑝 = 5.5 × 10−3
conf = 57.2% conf = 58.1%
A1: small  A2: no  A3: cube 
Q3: The large thing right of the big cyan rubber cube has what
shape?
Attacking Q3
A3: no
𝑝 = 5.2 × 10−3
conf = 44.6%
Figure 5. An example of physical-space adversaries in 3D visual
question answering on CLEVR (using a differentiable renderer).
In each example, the top row shows a testing image and three
questions, all of which are correctly answered. The following two
rows show the perturbations and the attacked image, respectively.
All perturbations are magnified by a factor of 5 and shifted by
128. p is the perceptibility value, and conf is the confidence (post-
softmax output) of choosing this answer.
is used, and three sets of physical parameters are at-
tacked either individually or jointly; when using the non-
differentiable renderer, the ZOO algorithm [9] is used with
δ = 10−3, η = 10−2, λ = 0.5.
4.2.1 Differentiable Renderer Results
Results are shown in Table 2. We observe similar phenom-
ena as in the classification experiments. This is expected,
since after the question is parsed and a neural module net-
work is generated, attacking either the image or the physical
space is essentially equivalent to that in the classification
task. Some typical examples are shown in Figure 5.
A side note comes from perturbing the material param-
eters. Although some visual questions are asking about the
material (e.g., metal or rubber) of an object, the success
rate of this type of questions does not differ from that in
attacking other questions significantly. This is because we
are constraining perceptibility, which does not allow the
material parameters to be modified by a large value.
A significant difference of visual question answering
comes from the so called language prior. With a language
parser, the network is able to clinch a small subset of an-
swers without looking at the image, e.g., when asked about
the color of an object, it is very unlikely for the network
to answer yes or three. Yet we find that sometimes the
network can make such ridiculous errors. For instance, in
Attacking Image Surface N. Illumination Material Combined
Perturbations Succ. p Succ. p Succ. p Succ. p Succ. p
On IEP [15] 96.33 2.1 83.67 6.8 48.67 9.5 8.33 12.3 90.67 8.8
Table 2. Effect of white-box adversarial attacks on CLEVR visual question answering. By combined, we allow the three sets of physical
parameters to be perturbed jointly. Succ. denotes the success rate of attacks (%, higher is better) of giving a correct answer, and p is the
perceptibility value (unit: 10−3, lower is better). All p values are measured in the image space, i.e., they are directly comparable.
Physical-dimension Attack on Q1
A1: small 
Part of Physical Attack Details
• Illumination
Δ𝐋key = 0.0,4.4, −5.8, −4.4 /100, …
• Object 1
Δ𝑟, Δ𝜃 = −0.1, 5.3 /100, …
• Object 4
Δ𝑥, Δ𝑦 = 3.7, −2.0 /100, …
• Object 6
Δ𝐜 = −1.5, −3.7, −0.2 /100, …
• ……
Physical-dimension Attack on Q2
A2: 0 
Part of Physical Attack Details
• Illumination
Δ𝐋key = 0.0, −11.3, −9.0,6.0 /100, …
• Object 1
Δ𝑟, Δ𝜃 = 0.7, −1.5 /100, …
• Object 4
Δ𝑥, Δ𝑦 = 0.4,0.1 /100, …
• Object 6
Δ𝐜 = 2.5, −1.1, −0.9 /100, …
• ……
Q1: There is a 
rubber thing that is 
left of the small cyan 
block and behind 
the tiny cyan ball; 
what is its size?
A1: large  A2: 1 
Q2: How many 
other tiny purple 
objects have the 
same shape as the 
large green object?
Figure 6. Examples of physical-space adversaries in 3D visual
question answering on CLEVR (using a non-differentiable ren-
derer). In each example, the top row contains a testing image and
three questions. In the bottom row, we show the perturbations
and attacked images. Detailed description of physical attacks
on selective dimensions are also provided. All units of physical
parameters follow the default setting in Blender.
the rightmost column of Figure 5, when asked about the
shape of an object, the network answers no after a non-
targeted attack.
4.2.2 Non-differentiable Renderer Results
We observe quite similar results as in ShapeNet experi-
ments. It is relatively easy to find image-space adversaries,
as our baseline successfully attacks 66 out of 100 targets
within 500 steps, and 93 within 1,200 steps. Due to com-
putational considerations, we set 500 to be the maximal
step in our attack experiment, but only find 22 physical-
space adversaries. This is expected, since visual question
answering becomes quite similar to classification after the
question is fixed.
We show two successfully attacked examples in Fig-
ure 6. Unlike ShapeNet experiments, color plays an im-
portant role in CLEVR, as many questions are related to
filtering/counting objects with specified colors. We find that
in many cases, our algorithm achieves success by mainly
attacking the color of the key object (i.e. that asked in
the question). This could seem problematic, as generated
adversaries may threaten the original correct answer. But
according to our inspection, the relatively big λ we chose
ensured otherwise. Nevertheless, this observation is inter-
esting because our algorithm does not know the question
(i.e., IEP is a black-box) or the answer (i.e., each answer
is simply a class ID), but it automatically tries to attack the
weakness (e.g., color) of the vision system.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we generalize adversarial examples beyond
the 2D image pixel intensities to 3D physical parameters.
We are mainly interested to know: are neural networks
vulnerable to perturbation on these intrinsic parameters that
define a 3D scene, just like they are vulnerable to artificial
noise added to the image pixels?
To study this, we plug a rendering module in front of
the state-of-the-art deep networks, in order to connect the
underlying 3D scene with the perceived 2D image. We
are then able to conduct gradient based attacks on this
more complete vision pipeline. Extensive experiments in
object classification and visual question answering show
that directly constructing adversaries in the physical space
is effective, but the success rate is lower than that in the
image space, and much heavier perturbations are required
for successful attacks. To the best of our knowledge, ours
is the first work to study imperceptible adversarial examples
in 3D, where each dimension of the adversarial perturbation
has clear meaning in the physical world.
Going forward, we see three potential directions for fur-
ther research. First, as a side benefit, our study may provide
practical tools to diagnose vision algorithms, especially
evaluating the robustness in some interpretable dimensions
such as color, lighting and object movements. Second, in
3D vision scenarios, we show the promise to defend the
deep neural networks against 2D adversaries by interpreting
an image in the physical space, so that the adversarial
effects are weakened or removed after re-rendering. Third,
while our pipeline will continue to benefit from higher
quality rendering, we also acknowledge the necessity to test
out our findings in real-world scenarios.
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Supplementary Material
A. Attack Curves with Different (Differentiable or Non-Differentiable) Renderers
In Figure 7, we plot how the average loss function value (probability of the original class, after softmax) changes with
respect to the number of attack iterations. Image-space attacks often succeed very quickly, whereas physical-space attacks
are much slower yet more difficult, especially for the factors of illumination and material.
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Figure 7. Attack curves for 3D object classification with a differentiable renderer.
In Figure 8, we plot how the average log-probability advantage (red) and image-space Euclidean distance (blue) change
with respect to the number of attack iterations. An average log-probability advantage of 0 means that all images have been
attacked successfully. Physical-space attacks are much more difficult to succeed and also require a much larger perceptibility.
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Figure 8. Attack curves for 3D object classification and visual question answering with a non-differentiable renderer.
From these curves, we can conclude that physical-space attacks especially adding factors with clear physical meanings are
much more difficult. This is arguably because most of these attacks impact the values of more than one pixels in the image
space, which raises higher difficulties to the optimizers (e.g., gradient-descent-based). We should also note that, with a more
powerful optimizer, it is possible to find more adversarial examples in the physical world.
